Designing an Explanatory Model of Organizational Shirking in Insurance Organizations

Abstract

The present study aimed to explain and validate a conceptual model of organizational shirking in the Iranian insurance industry by identifying the underlying conditions, processes, strategies, and consequences of this phenomenon. This applied study employed a mixed-method exploratory sequential design. In the qualitative phase, data were collected through 15 semi-structured interviews with insurance industry experts, senior managers, and human resource specialists. The data were analyzed using grounded theory through open, axial, and selective coding procedures. In the quantitative phase, a researcher-made questionnaire was developed based on the qualitative findings and administered to 340 employees and managers of insurance companies selected through stratified random sampling. Data analysis was conducted using structural equation modeling (SEM) with LISREL software. The validity and reliability of the instrument were confirmed through confirmatory factor analysis, Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity indices. Qualitative findings revealed that organizational shirking in the insurance sector functions as a defensive institutional mechanism emerging from the interaction of causal, contextual, and intervening conditions. Major causal conditions included accountability pressure without fair evaluation systems, weak feedback mechanisms, and job-preservation logic. One-sample t-test results indicated that all model constructs were significantly above the theoretical mean, with strategies and causal conditions showing the highest averages. Structural equation modeling demonstrated that causal conditions (0.41), contextual conditions (0.37), and intervening conditions (0.34) had significant positive effects on organizational shirking. Furthermore, organizational strategies significantly influenced both organizational shirking and its consequences, while goodness-of-fit indices confirmed the adequacy of the proposed model. The findings indicated that organizational shirking in the insurance industry is a structural, self-reproducing, and bureaucratically rationalized phenomenon sustained through formal language, symbolic documentation, and diffusion of responsibility. The continuation of this phenomenon leads to erosion of organizational trust, spread of silence culture, decline in creativity, and reduction of institutional legitimacy. Therefore, reforming performance evaluation systems, strengthening accountability transparency, enhancing organizational trust, and redesigning managerial mechanisms are essential for reducing organizational shirking and improving efficiency in the insurance sector.